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Abstract. Why some socio-economic reforms are successful and others are not? Why and how the
political regime and its institutions affect policy outcomes and implementation of a “narrow”
program of authoritarian modernisation (achievement of socio-economic growth without full-scale
democratisation)? The article reconsiders Russian experience of policy reforms in the 2000s as a case
of authoritarian modernisation in the context of post-Communist policy changes: less than half of the
proposals have been implemented, and only a few have been successful. This article attempts to
explain the factors and mechanisms of the successes and failures of policy reforms. We focus, on the
one hand, on the impact of electoral authoritarianism and the poor quality of the state on
opportunities and constraints for policy changes, and, on the other hand, on the institutional factors
which affect the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of the Russian government and the (in)
efficiency of its policies.
***
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Why some socio-economic reforms are successful and others are not? Scholars of different
disciplines pose this important question as a key issue for understanding the logic of modernisation.
For political scientists, an analysis of the impact of political and institutional arrangements on policy-
making is the focus of attention. To what extent the political regime and its institutions affect the
outcomes of major socio-economic reforms? Do these factors matter given the fact that the average
economic growth in both democratic and non-democratic regimes in the second half of the twentieth
century was nearly the same (Przeworski et al. 2000)? Can a reform-minded leader, supported by a
team of well-qualified experts, modernise his/her country without the fear of losing in free and fair
competitive elections? And what of the conditions supporting (or opposing) the successful
implementation of a “narrow” program of authoritarian modernisation (i.e. achievement of socio-
economic growth without full-scale democratisation)?
The Russian experience of socio-economic reforms in the 2000s can be perceived as a
“crucial case” of authoritarian modernisation in the context of post-Communist social and political
changes.  After  the  Soviet  collapse  and  the  following  turbulent  transition  to  a  market  economy,  an
electoral authoritarian regime, which incorporates meaningful yet unfair elections, emerged in Russia
(Howard, Roessler, 2006; Levitsky, Way, 2010; Golosov 2011; Morse, 2012; Gel’man 2015). In
2000, when Vladimir Putin came to power, the Russian government proposed an ambitious and
large-scale program of economic and social reforms in Russia. Liberal economists, who had greatly
influenced the policy agenda in the 1990s (Shleifer, Treisman, 2000), initiated some of these reforms
at that time. In the 2000s, they sought to implement their ideas under more favourable circumstances.
The 1990s had been marked by a deep and protracted economic transformation recession, a major
decline of state capacity, and constant intra-elite conflicts; by contrast, the 2000s became a period of
high economic growth, re-centralisation of the Russian government, and large-scale support of
Putin’s leadership by major political and economic actors as well as by Russian citizens. In reality,
the outcomes of the 2000s’ reforms have failed to meet the expectations of optimists and pessimists
alike. A decade later, the reformers themselves have assessed the implementation of their
programme, and their leading figures such as German Gref and Yevgeny Yasin realised that less than
half of the proposals have been implemented, and only a few have been successful. Several proposed
measures stopped at the stage of discussing good policy alternatives, and among those reforms which
have been implemented successfully, some have had a series of unintended consequences (Rogov
2010).
We need  to  explain  this  diversity  of  outcomes  of  policy  reforms,  considering  they  occurred
nearly simultaneously and within nearly the same economic and political circumstances. A
synchronic comparative analysis allows us to disregard certain factors such as the impact of the
Soviet legacy or Russian people’s’ public opinion: we do not assume that these factors were
unimportant, but they do not explain why some reforms succeeded and others failed. At the same
time,  the  widespread  statements  which  tend  to  explain  the  troubles  of  policy  reforms  by  the
resistance of interest groups (“oligarchs”, siloviki, regional leaders and other rent-seekers) (Shleifer,
Treisman 2000), the rise of global oil prices, or Putin’s interest in consolidating his personal political
power (Aslund 2007), are limited and insufficient. They do not adequately explain why the tax
reform  in  the  2000s  became  a  “success  story”,  but  the  reform  of  the  system  of  social  benefits
(monetizatsiya l’got)  failed.  Why  was  the  reform  of  the  school  graduate  evaluation  system
implemented despite considerable costs, while the reform of the state administrative apparatus and
the full-scale reorganisation of federal government agencies in fact led to an increased number of
bureaucrats and their empowerment? Putin, oil and siloviki alone are not responsible for the variation
of  outcomes  of  reforms  that  were  launched  almost  simultaneously  and  in  similar  conditions.  This
article attempts to explain the factors and mechanisms of the successes and failures of the 2000s’
policy reforms. We focus, on the one hand, on the impact of electoral authoritarianism and the poor
quality of the state on opportunities and constraints for policy changes, and, on the other hand, on the
institutional factors which affect the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of the Russian government
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and the inefficiency of its policies.
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we discuss the opportunities and constraints of
policy reforms in authoritarian regimes. Second, we analyse the impact of electoral authoritarianism
and of the institutional design of the executive on policy-making and implementation in case of
Russia. Third, we present a close look at a number of policy reforms of the 2000s that had different
outcomes  –  the  tax  and  budgetary  reforms,  the  educational  reform  and  the  administrative  reform.
Finally, we outline the major conclusions and implications of our analysis.
Temptations and Challenges of Authoritarian Modernisation
What could be more difficult than implementing social and economic reforms under the
conditions of a democratic regime? From the policy-making perspective, democratic institutions
have numerous defects that prevent good governance. Regular, competitive elections provoke
“political business cycles” (Nordhaus 1975) which contribute to populist policies, and shut the
windows of opportunity for implementation of reforms. The separation of powers allows veto players
(Tsebelis 2002) to block key decisions and/or dilute their essence. Multi-party coalition politics often
results in adopting partial and compromise decisions. The political representation of interest groups
stimulates the domination of distributional coalitions that are engaged in rent-seeking (Olson 1982).
Both interest groups and political parties aim at state capture (i.e., turning state policies into hostages
of private actors) by leveraging their access to governmental posts to reward their allies (Hellman
1998). Many experts have noted the inefficiency of policy reforms from Latin America (Geddes
1994; Haggard, Kaufman 1995) to Eastern Europe (Ganev 2001, Gryzmala-Busse 2003), where both
the interests of political actors and the institutional design hindered good governance and successful
economic policies. It is no wonder that some authors suggested implementing major socio-economic
reforms in Russia under conditions of authoritarianism as a response to the “dilemma of
simultaneity” (Offe 1991). Democratisation was considered here at best as a postponed side effect of
step-by-step building efficient institutions that provide stable long-term economic growth
(Polterovich, Popov 2006).
This is the argument that underpins the logic of a “narrow” version of modernization
(Gel’man, 2014), or an agency-driven authoritarian modernisation project, perceived in the narrow
sense: a set of technical policy measures aimed to achieve successful socio-economic development.
At the same time, the broad aspects of political modernisation (i.e., political freedoms) either remain
beyond the current modernisation agenda or are postponed to a distant future in several decades until
structure-induced societal changes will allow pursuit gradual step-by-step liberalization “from
above”. This approach is deeply rooted in intellectual traditions (Huntington 1968) and fuelled by
success stories of various authoritarian reforms ranging from South Korea in the 1960s-1980s to
Chile under Pinochet. The temptation to reform with a “free hand,” without the constraints and
defects inherent in democracies, is amplified by the fact that authoritarianism allows the government
to  be  insulated  from  the  impact  of  political  parties  and  public  preferences;  thus,  it  is  able  to
implement those unpopular policy reforms that are so often blocked under democratic regimes. In the
context of contemporary Russia, this project was vigorously advocated by Dmitry Medvedev in his
manifesto (Medvedev 2009).
The paradox is that “success stories” of authoritarian policy reforms are quite rare.
Autocracies have demonstrated a much higher diversity of growth rate than democracies (Przeworski
et al. 2000). As Dani Rodrik pointed out, “For every Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, there are many
like Mobuto Sese Seko of the Congo” (Rodrik 2010) who lead their countries into decay. This
statement should not be understood merely as an assessment of the personal traits of certain leaders.
Many autocrats genuinely pursue the project of authoritarian modernisation, but its implementation is
blocked by both structural constraints (such as the level of socio-economic development, path-
dependency of a given country, etc.) and political and institutional constraints (caused by the features
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of country’s authoritarian regime and its rules of the game). This is why authoritarian policy reforms
have brought such diverse results. Recent analyses of various types of authoritarian regimes and their
political institutions (Geddes 2003; Gandhi 2008) demonstrated that these differences also affect the
efficiency of policies proposed and implemented by these regimes.
On these grounds, we argue that electoral authoritarianism complicates the task of
implementing socio-economic reforms. From policy perspective, electoral authoritarian regimes
combine the worst features of both democracies and autocracies. On the one hand, they suffer from
the same defects as democratic regimes: political business cycles (Treisman, Gimpelson 2001,
Starodubtsev 2014) and distributional coalitions of rent-seekers (Shirikov 2010) do not disappear. On
the other hand, these regimes rely heavily on mechanisms such as a politicised state-controlled
economy, which is based on the coercive apparatus of the state (Levitsky, Way 2010), and the
patronage and buying of loyalty of the elite and the masses alike (Magaloni 2006, Greene 2010). All
of these instances provide incentives for politicians and bureaucrats that prevent the implementation
of major policy changes. In addition, these regimes are faced with the risk of leadership change as
the key challenge to authoritarianism (Geddes 2003, Hale 2006). Here a regime’s survival depends
on mass support to a greater degree than both in “classical” (or “hegemonic”) (Howard, Roessler,
2006) autocracies and in democratic regimes: so large-scale modernisation (even in a “narrow”
format) is an extremely risky project for electoral authoritarian regimes and their leaders.
Another important constraint for authoritarian modernisation is the limited set of political
tools  available  to  a  regime  to  achieve  such  a  project’s  goals.  In  pursuit  of  policy  reforms,
authoritarian leaders can rely on bureaucrats, siloviki, or the hegemonic (or dominant) party (or a
combination of these pillars) (Geddes 2003). However, these mechanisms are rarely useful for
implementing reforms. For efficient use of bureaucracy (this tool of authoritarian modernisation was
actually employed in the 2000s in Russia) the reformers need a Weberian quality to the state
apparatus (Evans, Rauch 1999), that is, a high level of professional qualification among officials,
strong incentives for them to achieve the goals set by the reformers, and an embedded state
autonomy (the bureaucracy’s insulation from the influence of interest groups) (Evans 1995). Leaders
cannot develop these conditions from scratch, though, in theory, they can build these institutions over
a long period of time in a (successful) authoritarian regime.
The electoral authoritarian regime that emerged in Russia after the Soviet collapse of the
USSR was not unique in this respect, but it has certain special features defined by the logic of the
post-Communist transformation. In the 1990s policy reforms faced the problem of a weak state with
a high level of horizontal and vertical fragmentation (Volkov 2002, Stoner-Weiss 2006). As a result,
the central government resorted to compromises with “oligarchs” and regional leaders; this raised the
social costs of the reforms (Hellman 1998, Shleifer, Treisman 2000). Strengthening state capacity,
alongside the rapid economic growth of the 2000s, allowed the central government to implement its
policies relatively successfully and reduce the influence of the “oligarchs” (Volkov 2008) and
regional leaders (Gel’man 2009). But the poor quality of public administration (Colton, Holmes
2006, Taylor 2011) and the bureaucracy’s inefficiency (Brym, Gimpelson 2004) were major
constraints. By time of the Soviet collapse, the bureaucratic machine was already suffering from
deep institutional decay, and the post-Soviet period deepened these problems. Electoral
authoritarianism provided incentives for the use of the state apparatus to maximise electoral results
(Reuter, Robertson 2012), to the detriment of the quality of governance; the Kremlin preferred
loyalty rather than efficiency in political appointments (Egorov, Sonin 2004). The regime’s
dependence on buying electoral loyalty, so vividly visible in the 1990s, (Treisman, Gimpelson 2001)
increased further still in the 2000s (Scherbak 2007).
In  sum,  the  political  conditions  of  authoritarian  modernisation  in  Russia  in  the  2000s  were
quite unfavourable to begin with; the combination of electoral authoritarianism and poor quality of
governance hindered the success of full-scale simultaneous reforms in various social and economic
arenas. The reformers could only hope to establish some “pockets of efficiency” (Geddes 1994), i.e.
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achieve success in certain high-priority policy areas, where the reforms could be more successful,
while in other policy areas reforms could be either suspended or failed completely. Although the
analysis of Russian modernisation in the 2000s confirms these expectations, a closer look at the
political and institutional environment of adoption and implementation of policy changes in Russia
will help us to understand the logic and variations of policy reforms in different areas.
Russia in the 2000s: Institutions and Incentives
The influence of major political institutions such as the separation of powers, and electoral
and party systems, on policy-making has been widely analysed, but only focusing on democratic
political regimes (Haggard, McCubbins 2001), while the effects of authoritarian political institutions
have been under-explored. Under authoritarianism, parliaments and political parties perform a
secondary role in decision-making (Gandhi 2008). The major policy-making agent is the
government, which is appointed and controlled by authoritarian leadership. In terms of institutional
design, present-day Russia is a typical case of the “dual executive” within the framework of a
presidential-parliamentary model (Shugart, Carey 1992; Morgan-Jones, Shleiter, 2004). The Russian
president, as a popularly elected head of the state, can appoint and dismiss the cabinet as a whole as
well as its individual members. Although the prime minister is approved by the State Duma, he/she is
dependent on a president who can abolish any of the prime minister’s decisions and can issue
presidential decrees which the government must follow. Thus, the Russian institutional design
intentionally provides that the government hold a minimal level of autonomy, and perform technical
(rather than political) functions. Its role is reduced to implementing the tasks posed by the president,
and performing routine,  daily administrative work in the social  and economic policy areas (Huskey
1999, Shevchenko 2004).
This model of state governance, codified in the 1993 Constitution, was inherited from both
the  Soviet  model  (based  on  an  informal  division  of  labour  between  the  Central  Committee  of  the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Council of Ministers) and the Russian Imperial model
(based  on  the  monarch’s  control  of  both  the  royal  court  and  the  cabinet  of  ministers).  From  an
authoritarian regime’s perspective this model has both advantages and disadvantages. The major
advantage is the opportunity for the president to replace top officials if they are inefficient and/or
politically disloyal or if the president intends to change his/her policy. In addition, such a model
allows shifting the responsibility for policy implementation, and switching the blame toward the
government rather than the president (in the 1990s, Yeltsin used this method quite frequently,
reshuffling his government several times). At the same time, citizens’ assessment of economic policy
performance is an important source of mass support for electoral authoritarian regimes (Rose et al
2011; Treisman 2011); therefore the president is vitally interested in successful government. The
problem is that the coexistence of the president with capable and popular government can lead to an
erosion of the presidential political monopoly; a successful prime minister can challenge the
incumbent in the next electoral cycle as an opposition-backed candidate and/or a potential successor
(Hale 2006) (as shown by the cases of Yevgeny Primakov in Russia and Viktor Yushchenko in
Ukraine). The combination of great managerial efficiency and unconditional personal loyalty to the
boss is a rare combination among top officials. As a result, the rise of the principal-agent problem is
deeply embedded in this model.
A low level of government autonomy leads to the transformation of the cabinet of ministers
from a collective entity of key decision-makers to a technocratic set of officials responsible for
implementing the commands by the president and/or prime minister. The president (in some
instances, prime minster) (Shevchenko 2004, Huskey 2010) “hires” individuals for executive
positions, considering them to be technocratic managers rather than politicians. Hence, the cabinet in
this system of governance is neither a group of officials who are politically responsible before the
parliament  nor  a  team  of  professionals  who  share  common  policy  goals  and  methods.  The  prime
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minister  is  responsible  for  coordinating  this  complex  web of  relationships.  He/she  is  dependent  on
numerous deputy prime ministers who supervise various state agencies (at times, there have been as
many as ten of these deputy prime ministers in Russia). As a result, policy-making under these
conditions turns into complex and often inefficient series of bargains and ad hoc agreements between
several state agencies. Top officials have to spend countless resources to win intra-governmental
struggles (Kas’yanov 2009). This is why policy-making in Russia is often perceived by observers as
a very difficult process (Gilman 2010).
In Russia’s case, policy-making becomes even more complicated due to additional
institutional glitches. First, the agencies responsible for national defence, state security, and foreign
affairs have been directly subordinate to the president since 1994 despite the fact that their chiefs are
formally members of the government (later, other agencies were also added to this list). Second, in
order to resolve the principal-agent problem, presidential control has been imposed over the
government; this role is performed by the presidential administration, directly subordinate to the
head of the state (the Central Committee of the Communist Party performed the same function
during the Soviet period). This model intentionally creates parallel governance structures, which
often compete during the policy process, and therefore hinder decision-making (Huskey 1999).
Third, the key ministers and/or deputy prime ministers who are personally linked with the president
are  able  to  influence  major  policy  decisions,  bypassing  the  web of  agencies  or  even  bypassing  the
prime minister. Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov in 1997-1998 (Gilman 2010) and Aleksey
Kudrin and German Gref in 2000-2004 (Pis’mennaya 2013) successfully employed this policy
strategy. Last but not least, a number of presidential decisions are often prepared without the
involvement of the governmental officials responsible for certain policy areas. As a result, these
presidential decrees sometimes cannot be implemented. In addition to horizontal fragmentation
(between governmental agencies and other federal executive offices), vertical fragmentation between
the central (federal) government and its branches at subnational level also plays a significant role. In
the 1990s, a full-scale decentralisation of governance contributed to the capture of territorial
branches of federal agencies by the regional elites. In the 2000s, a re-centralisation of state
governance re-established the federal Centre’s political control over regional authorities, but did not
set up a division of competences and resources between federal and regional governments. The shift
to a hierarchical subordination of territorial governance (the “power vertical”) exacerbated the
agency problem in relationships between the Centre and the regions (Sharafutdinova 2010; Gel’man,
Ryzhenkov 2011).
Given these institutional arrangements, one might argue that the Russian executive, even in
routine governance, must deal with aggravation of the principal-agent problems in relations between
both the president and the executive and within the government. It complicates the coordination of
different agencies and their actions, and contributes to a protracted policy-making process and/or the
adoption of inefficient decisions. Under these circumstances the implementation of a full-scale
reform programme faces serious obstacles. Any bureaucracy is known to be interested in preserving
the status quo (Horn 1995). Russian political institutions are not capable of overcoming latent
resistance from bureaucrats, especially if and when policy-making requires interdepartmental
coordination of different “layers” of the power vertical and numerous “gates” of the federal
government. If reforms need concerted, large-scale and highly coordinated action from various
segments of the federal and regional bureaucracies, this becomes a major problem for policy
changes. The lack of political accountability and the inefficiency of mechanisms of centralised
control (Brym, Gimpelson 2004) pushed officials to minimise their efforts to implement policy
changes approved by the president. The more significant the involvement of the bureaucracy in
policy implementation, the stronger the resistance it experiences from most officials. The policy
reformers may be endorsed by a few ideologically-driven proponents of these reforms and/or by
policy entrepreneurs who expect to achieve personal gains from successful policy implementation.
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In the beginning of the 2000s, favourable political conditions for policy reforms appeared to emerge
in Russia. Due to rapid economic growth after a long and protracted recession (Treisman 2011),
Putin gained significant popular support. After the 1999 election, the Kremlin was able to establish a
pro-presidential majority in the State Duma that approved almost all of the Kremlin’s initiatives
(Remington 2006). Strengthening state capacity (Easter 2008) and recentralising state governance
(Gel’man 2009) allowed the government to reduce the influence of rent-seekers in policy-making.
But the major driver of policy reforms was Putin’s genuine will to implement socio-economic
changes. These circumstances opened the window of policy opportunity (Kingdon 2003) that had
been closed in the second half of the 1990s (Aslund 2007).
The concept of the reform programme (“the Gref Programme” or “Strategy 2010”) was
elaborated in the early 2000s by the experts of the Centre for Strategic Research (CSR, Tsentr
strategicheskikh razrabotok). Under Putin’s patronage, this centre aimed to develop the previous
decade’s policy proposals. The choice of policy options and Putin’s policy positions were influenced
by experience. Putin prioritised (Putin 1999) building a strong and efficient state which provides
long-term economic growth on the basis of financial stabilisation and a successful fiscal policy.
Indeed, the weakness of the Russian state and its fiscal crisis is justly considered to be the ultimate
cause of policy failures in the 1990s (Easter 2006). Therefore, major reforms in these policy areas
became  the  key  points  of  the  reformers’  agenda  in  the  beginning  of  the  2000s.  At  the  same  time,
social policy changes that would contribute to the societal development in the medium-term
perspective were not declared to be top priorities, even though half of Gref’s programme was
devoted to policy changes in these areas. Under electoral authoritarian regimes, social policies are
often perceived not as a strategic goal of government,  but as a means of providing electoral  loyalty
(Magaloni 2006; Greene 2010). The experience of both the 1990s (Treisman, Gimpelson 2001) and
the 2000s demonstrates that the Russian case is not an exception here.
Despite the CSR’s role as a think-tank, there were no headquarters that managed or even
coordinated various reforms. They were implemented as a set of inconsistent measures controlled by
specific ministries. Mikhail Kas’yanov, the Prime Minister from May 2000 to February 2004, did not
participate in preparing Strategy 2010. His views often contradicted the policy ideas of key ministers
that developed this programme (Kas’yanov 2009, Pis’mennaya 2013). His successor Mikhail
Fradkov did not become a significant political actor. In practice, all important decisions (including
large-scale reorganisation of the Russian government) were made by the president. In some cases,
the responsibilities for reforms were concentrated in one governmental agency, but often they were
divided between several ministries and agencies in both the Centre and the regions. While some
reforms required only the one-time adoption of a package of legal acts, others included a sequential
chain of actions that required coordination of various actors for a long period of time. Theoretically,
we can expect that inconsistent and protracted policy changes will be implemented in an inefficient
way (Pressman, Wildavsky 1973), especially under conditions of an electoral authoritarian regime,
which is even more dependent on political business cycles than a democracy (Greene 2010); so
without immediate positive results in the short-term, these reforms may be blocked and ultimately
fail.
Thus, the features of the Russian bureaucracy and the institutional design of the executive
imposed  major  constraints  on  the  implementation  of  reforms in  the  early  2000s.  The  possibility  of
overcoming these obstacles depends, in our opinion, upon three factors: (1) the strategic priority of
certain reforms for the president; (2) the implementation of a given reform by reformers who are
concentrated in a single powerful agency; (3) the reform requiring one-time governmental actions
that are implemented within a short period of time (see Table 1).
Table 1 is here
How and why have these factors influenced specific policy reforms? To answer this question
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we will analyse the experience of policy changes in Russia in the first half of the 2000s.
Successes and Failures of Reforms: Case Studies
Tax and Budgetary Reforms: A Success Story
The tax and budgetary reform implemented in the early 2000s in Russia became a model
example  of  the  most  successful  policy  changes  of  that  period.  In  the  1990s,  the  emergence  of  the
modern tax system in Russia was accompanied by a weak state capacity, a spontaneous
decentralisation of governance, political instability, and the obvious imperfections of many legal
regulations (Volkov 2002; Easter 2006, 2008). As a result, Russian authorities had major difficulties
with tax collection. The widespread use (or abuse) of numerous tax exemptions, non-monetary
payments in the form of different offsets and money substitutes, and the proliferation of legal, extra-
legal, and illegal schemes of tax evasion, combined with the high taxation rates and the large number
of taxes, made the government’s fiscal policies extraordinarily inefficient (Nazarov 2011, p.467-
479).
From a formal viewpoint, the tax reform involved the development, adoption and
implementation of the Tax Code, which established unified rules of taxation and fiscal governance in
Russia.  Its  first  chapter,  which defined the foundations of the country’s tax system, was adopted in
1998. But the development of the second chapter took five more years. In 2000-2004, a new set of
taxes and tax rates was established which replaced or defined previous ones. As a result, on the one
hand, the tax burden on individuals and business was drastically reduced (especially due to the
changes in the taxation rates of value added tax and profit tax, the introduction of the unified social
tax and so on). On the other hand, the fiscal revenues of the state budget increased. This was
achieved through the adoption of a flat rate of personal income tax (13%) instead of a so-called
progressive rate, which stimulated tax evasion among relatively well-to-do taxpayers (Appel 2011).
As a result, between 2000 and 2007, extra revenues for the Russian budget reached an overall level
of 1% of the GDP (Nazarov 2011, p. 495).
In addition, the government managed to push a new model of taxation for oil companies
through the parliament. Firstly, the subsoil use tax has been established, with its rate depending on
the sector of economy and the production costs. Secondly, a progressive rate of oil export duties was
introduced, and oil products excises were increased. While global oil prices were growing
unprecedentedly after 2003, these policy measures contributed to an immense increase in budget
revenues.
The increase of tax revenues from the oil sector allowed the government to establish the
Stabilisation Fund of the Russian Federation – a mechanism of sterilisation of budgetary revenues
intended to prevent high rates of inflation and to form financial reserves in case of a major decrease
of global oil prices. The Stabilisation Fund was established despite resistance from certain
government ministers and from a number of MPs and numerous lobbyists who were interested in
spending extra revenues on current projects instead of saving funds for the future (Zaostrovtsev
2010). The prudence of this policy became evident during the 2008-2009 economic crisis when the
Reserve Fund of the Russian Federation (which was formed with the use of the Stabilisation Fund’s
resources) covered the Russian budget deficit.
Every aspect of the tax reform had its  own influential  opponents.  MPs from the Communist
Party of the Russian Federation opposed the flat rate of income tax. They considered it a means of
tax evasion for the wealthy (Appel 2011). Representatives of the state pension and social insurance
funds argued against the unified social tax because they lost control over collection of money paid by
companies. Finally, oil companies attempted to block the introduction of the subsoil use tax because
it greatly increased taxation in that sector (Jones Luong, Weinthal 2010; Gustafson 2012;
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Pis’mennaya 2013). However, despite this resistance the tax reform was implemented.
The key factor in this success story was Putin’s full-scale support of the reformers – Aleksey
Kudrin, the minister of finance, and German Gref, the minister of economic development, who relied
upon their teams, which included officials in their respective ministries and numerous experts and
advisors. Besides the personal credibility of the reformers, based on the common experience they
shared during their service in St Petersburg’s city administration, Putin considered the making of an
efficient tax system as a priority for his agenda. Thus, he included the introduction of the flat rate of
personal income tax in his Budgetary Address to the Russian parliament. This move consolidated the
presidential majority in the State Duma (Remington 2006) in support of this decision. The decision
on the introduction of subsoil use tax was more complicated. Russian oil companies influenced the
State  Duma  budgetary  committee  to  a  large  degree,  and  had  support  from  a  number  of  MPs.  But
despite lobbyists’ efforts, the government was able to squeeze this proposal through the State Duma.
At the end of the day, the oil lobby accepted a consolation prize – the government would be prepared
to decrease the subsoil tax rate to zero if the price of oil dropped below $8 per barrel: in the event,
this did not happen (Gustafson 2012; Pis’mennaya 2013).
Another factor in the success of the tax and budgetary reform was the concentration of
policy-making in the hands of reformers and their supporters. Close connections between Putin,
Kudrin, and Gref allowed the two ministers to insulate the decision making process from their major
opponents. Indeed, Putin unilaterally adopted many financial and economic decisions without the
participation of the prime minister or the cabinet (Pis’mennaya 2013). For example, a bill on
replacing numerous social payments by the unified social tax (paid by companies) was submitted to
the parliament without the agreement of other state officials, including the heads of the pension and
social insurance funds. The stability of the new rules of the game was supported by the long service
of the reformers as ministers: Gref left the Ministry of Economic Development in 2007, and Kudrin
was fired in 2011.
Finally, the tax reform was not subjected to a long implementation process. The decision on
the flat rate of the income tax was proposed and adopted within one year. Then, the Ministry of
Finance managed to protect this change from several initiatives to introduce progressive taxation,
arguing that the new mode of taxation was efficient because budgetary revenues had increased.
However, some elements of tax reform did not survive in the longer term: this was the case with the
unified social tax, which provided governmental control over the use of funds, but did not increase
budgetary revenues as such. As a result, in 2010 Tatiana Golikova, then the Minister of Public Health
and Social Development, achieved a return to the previous scheme of social payment taxation
(Nazarov 2011).
Preserving the Stabilisation Fund became the government’s most difficult task. In 2006, the
Investment Fund of the Russian Federation was established within the federal budget, and a certain
amount of money from the Stabilisation Fund was diverted to the Investment Fund. The new
budgetary instrument was intended to accumulate financial resources to fund nation-wide
infrastructural projects. Soon, those resources were allocated to not only nation-wide projects but
also regional ones. In 2008, the Stabilisation Fund was split into the Reserve Fund and the Fund for
National Prosperity. The former performed the same functions as the Stabilisation Fund, and the
latter was aimed to balance the budget of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (Zaostrovtsev
2010). Although the use of the Stabilisation Fund was of great help during the 2008-2009 economic
crisis it did not contribute to the country’s long-term development.
However, even this success story was limited in scope. Another element of the budgetary
reform initiated by Kudrin – the development of the principles of performance-based budgeting – did
not achieve any significant results (Sokolov 2011; Pis’mennaya 2013). The task of increasing the
efficiency of public expenditures could not be resolved only by the Ministry of Finance (even with
presidential support). It required the efforts of a number of officials among mid- and street-level
bureaucrats, and other participants of the budgetary process, who would have to be suitably
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motivated and consent to shift their approach for effective use of budgetary spending. As with the
case of administrative reform (see below), there was a shortage of such officials in the state
apparatus. As a result, this reform failed.
The implementation of tax and budgetary reforms demonstrated that the institutional
foundations of a success story heavily depend on presidential support of a well-formulated policy
programme. Such a programme needs to be conducted by an administratively strong team of
reformers who are able to disregard various pressure groups, and to push through those reforms
which not involve a large number of participants at the implementation stage. But this case also
displays the unique array of factors necessary for policy success. The lack of at least one of these
factors would lead to the window of opportunity closing for that reform’s implementation.
Educational Reform: Mixed Results
In  the  1990s,  the  Russian  authorities  made  several  attempts  to  reform  Russian  school
education. Both the content of school education and the principles of educational governance
urgently needed to change. The inefficient use of limited financial resources by the state officials
responsible for school and higher education and the lack of an independent system of evaluation of
schools and universities were the most important institutional obstacles to developing Russian
education. Under these circumstances, the educational managers were not interested in improving the
quality of education. Secondary schools did not have external evaluations of their performance. Final
school exams were conducted by the same teachers who taught the courses. To enter university,
potential students used a parallel system of preparing for the entrance exams (many parents paid fees
to private teachers out of their pockets). The majority of schools located in rural areas could not
provide decent quality of educational services. Educational mobility, even within Russia, was limited
by significant costs. This reduced the level of competition for students between universities,
especially at the regional level (Agranovich, Kozhevnikova 2006). Attempts to solve these problems
in the 1990s faced a lack of funding from the federal budget and resistance from the conservative
part of the professional community and political elite (Startsev 2012).
The fact that a programme of educational reform was included in Strategy 2010 opened the
window of political opportunity for the reformers. In 2001 the Ministry of Education launched the
experiment of introducing the Unified State Exam (Edinyi gosudarstvennyi ekzamen) in certain
Russian regions. This mechanism replaced the final examination procedures in secondary schools
and combined them with entrance examination procedures in universities. It used a single set of
written exams based upon a set of formalised tests. Their results were reflected in final school
certificates, while the universities accepted these scores for entrance examinations.
In 2002, as another experiment, the mechanism of state financial obligations to individuals
(gosudarstvennye imennye finansovye obyazatel’stva, GIFO) was introduced, often called
“educational vouchers” in the media. The idea was that after passing the Unified State Exam, a
school graduate could be eligible to receive a certain amount of public funds for study at a university.
The  size  of  the  state  grant  would  depend  on  the  Unified  State  Exam  score,  and  the  rest  of  the
university’s fees should be covered by the student (or, rather, by their parents). This policy measure
was designed to contribute to the targeted distribution of public finances among higher education
institutions, increase competition between universities to attract the best school graduates, and
stimulate a fee-paying model of higher education in Russia (Kliachko 2002).
The results of these reforms were ambiguous. The GIFO experiment lasted for only three
years in a limited number of regions. Upon its negative evaluation by the professional community,
the federal authorities abandoned its subsequent implementation and the GIFO mechanism was
buried. The Unified State Exam experiment, on the other hand, covered more new regions every year
and by 2008 became a nationwide examination. As a result, the State Duma had to amend the law on
education in Russia to recognise the Unified State Exam as the only way to complete secondary
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school and take university entrance exams simultaneously. The opportunity to use the results of the
Unified State Exam to apply for several universities at once dramatically increased competition for
students in the university education system and improved educational mobility. At the same time,
scandals during the examination occur every year due to the regular leakage of tests and answer keys,
the mass involvement of school teachers in illegally assisting pupils to pass the tests, the dubious
distribution  of  the  best  results  among  the  Russian  regions  (thus  scores  in  the  republics  of  North
Caucasus,  despite  their  notoriously  low  human  capital,  were  higher  than  those  in  Moscow  and  St
Petersburg), and the like. Almost 15 years later, the Unified State Exam has not become recognised
by Russian society as a legitimate way to evaluate students in either schools or universities. Recently,
Ministry of Education officials have discussed an opportunity to return to the previous practice of
final examinations in schools, and proposed to increase the number of universities that would be able
to use additional entrance exams, thus compromising the very idea of the reform. Public opinion of
the Unified State Exam is also exceedingly critical (Rossiyane 2013).
The educational reforms could not be implemented by their initiators alone. They involved an
unprecedented number of participants in the policy process, ranging from members of the State
Duma and regional and local officials to university rectors, school directors and school teachers. The
complexity of the reform’s implementation and the resistance of numerous interest groups were quite
significant. As a result, there was a serious risk of the reform’s failure and a return to the previous
status quo: in fact, this happened with the introduction of the GIFO. The Ministry of Education did
not initiate this innovation: it was proposed by the experts of the Higher School of Economics, who
included this policy measure in Strategy 2010. However, it caused a furious reaction in the State
Duma and was ultimately protested even more passionately than the Unified State Exam. The
universities’ representatives were also against changing financial arrangements in higher university
education. As a result, the experiment was considered as a failure and abandoned (Startsev 2012, p.
107). At the same time, the ministry was interested in implementing the Unified State Exam and was
able to overcome equally strong resistance to this innovation through step-by-step implementation of
the reform. The experimental status of new mechanism allowed development and adjustment of new
organisational and substantive arrangements of the examination and reduced the intensity of the
debate over the reform, which had not yet been converted into a legal act and, therefore, could
theoretically be abandoned. When the experiment covered the entire country, its disparate opponents
could not make the government and its loyalists in the State Duma prevent its legal formalisation. As
a result, the policy entrepreneurs from the Ministry of Education could implement this project while
insulating the educational reform from the influence of interest groups.
Despite their social significance, educational reforms have never been attributed to Vladimir
Putin. He made several statements in support of Russian education, but hardly considered this policy
area a priority in his agenda. On the one hand, educational reforms (regardless of results) cannot
provide a positive effect from a short-term perspective. On the other hand, Putin sought to keep a
distance from the initiators of unpopular policy changes and from decisions made by officials in the
ministerial level. At the same time, during the 2000s and 2010s the educational reform was
implemented consistently and without significant changes in its content. This indicates that Putin and
Medvedev supported these policy measures. In 2011, Andrey Fursenko, then the minister of
education, suggested that the Unified State Exam should include only three disciplines – Russian,
maths and one of the foreign languages, but president Medvedev rejected this suggestion:
“Approaches to conducting the Unified State Exam have been determined, and the exam has proved
a normal way of testing knowledge” (Chernykh 2011).
The Unified State Exam’s major problems were to a certain degree caused by the misuse of
its results by the government. The reformers initially considered the Unified State Exam as a means
of external evaluation of the performance of schools and educational bureaucrats at the local level.
But later on the Kremlin used the results of Unified State Exam as one of the criteria of assessing the
performance of regional authorities within the framework of a re-established power vertical (Reuter,
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Robertson 2012). As a consequence, the exam scores of school graduates gained administrative and
political status. This became one of the reasons for numerous violations during examinations. The
efforts of regional and local bureaucrats have been aimed not at increasing the quality of school
education, but at achieving high scores at any cost. In this way, the functions of the Unified State
Exam have been emasculated and its role has changed.
Nevertheless, the educational reforms can be considered an example of successful gradual
and consistent implementation of new institutional arrangements. Initially, these initiatives were
implemented as experiments concerning the approbation of new mechanisms in some regions. It was
impossible  to  introduce  the  Unified  State  Exam  in  all  Russian  regions  simultaneously  due  to  both
technological constraints (lack of experience, high level of uncertainty of outcomes and high cost of
potential  failure  of  the  reform)  and  political  ones  (most  politicians,  professionals,  and  ordinary
citizens did not accept the idea of an educational reform). The decision on the Unified State Exam
was de facto adopted and implemented by the Ministry of Education. The legislative formalisation of
the Unified State Exam happened only in 2009 when the State Duma was under the full  control of
the presidential administration. At the same time, the same strategy contributed to the failure of the
implementation of the GIFO system, which could demonstrate reliable results only nationwide and
not on the level of individual regions (Experiment 2009).
To summarise, the institutional changes in educational policy demonstrate the limits of
presidential influence on the implementation of reforms. Even modest presidential support helps for
the adoption of major decisions and their implementation despite the resistance of various interest
groups, especially if the reformers can insist on at least a part of their proposals. But the performance
of street-level bureaucracy (Lipsky 1980) can reduce the efficiency of implementation of top-down
ideas.
Administrative Reform: From Bad to Worse
The administrative reform was aimed at solving the problem of inefficiency of public
administration, which hindered the country’s social and economic development. By the end of the
1990s, a paradox of bad governance was widely observed in Russia. Formally, the government had
many regulating powers, but its performance was very poor (Popov 2004). The influence of big
business on the adoption and implementation of many important policy decisions led to state capture
(Hellman 1998). At the same time, entrenched officials formed their clienteles, which included
representatives of different businesses as well as other social groups (Tompson 2007). The functions
of ministries and state agencies often duplicated each other. The transformation of Russian
“bargaining federalism” generated politically motivated division of powers between federal and
regional authorities (Stoner-Weiss 2006, Gel’man 2009). The decline of state capacity and state
autonomy raised doubts about the federal government’s ability to not only implement any reforms
but even to conduct routine day-by-day governance1.
Formally, the administrative reform was launched in 20032 and continues even now. But the
most significant policy measures – (1) the revision of the functions of the government agencies, (2)
the revision of the so-called redundant functions of the government, (3) the redistribution of other
functions between federal and sub-national government agencies, and (4) the major structural
changes to the federal government – were implemented in 2001-2004. After that, the reform was
focused on the technologies of improving government services provision, and no longer involved
1 This statement is confirmed by numerous evaluations. According to the World Bank, the percentile rank of
Governance Effectiveness in Russia in 2000 was at 23 (out of 100) and the rank of Regulatory Quality at 28
(Worldwide 2014). In 2002 Russia took 71st place (out of 102), according to the Transparency International
Corruption Perception’s Index. This result was close to India, Honduras and Zimbabwe (Corruption 2002).




In fact, the reform failed to contribute to improvement of public administration in Russia3.
The redistribution of powers between layers of government led to a recentralisation of governance
that more resembled a unitary state (Starodubtsev 2013). The transformation of the federal
government into three types of organizational entities (ministries, federal agencies and federal
services), and the revision of their powers, did not contribute to transparent and efficient governance,
but rather complicated the interactions between the governmental agencies that were responsible for
the same policy areas (Dmitriev 2011). The only meaningful outcome achieved by these policy
changes  was  a  significant  increase  in  the  officials’  salaries.  But  the  quality  of  personnel  and  the
motivation of officials, which had been heavily criticised (Brym, Gimpelson 2004), did not change in
practice. So despite a number of technological innovations in the everyday practices of interactions
between bureaucrats, citizens and business people, the quality of public services has not improved.
Moreover, in many instances it has become even worse. But why were the results of administrative
reform so poor?
One might argue that the administrative reform was on the periphery of presidential attention.
Initially,  the  development  of  this  reform  was  one  of  the  key  items  for  the  Centre  for  Strategic
Research (Logunov 2006, p. 23). Later on, this reform became a priority for the government and the
presidential administration. In his annual address to the parliament, Putin paid specific attention to it.
In 2003, admitting significant problems in achieving the policy goals, he even promised to provide
“needed political  impetus” for more active policy in this area (Putin 2003).  However,  Putin did not
take the most important step: he did not provide any organisational support for the planned reform.
All basic policy measures in this area were coordinated by the governmental Commission for
Administrative Reform, which was headed by one of the deputy prime ministers. Thus, the status of
this coordination centre was relatively low. In addition, this commission did not possess enough
powers  to  implement  reforms  its  role  was  limited  to  policy  proposals.  Its  scope  was  limited  to
proposing changes in the structure of the government and in the functions of different kinds of
governmental agencies. But the reform of public service, changes in its personnel and the revision of
other major regulations were delegated to the Commission for Reforming Public Service, headed by
Dmitry Medvedev (at that time, the first deputy head of the presidential administration). The
members of that commission took a conservative approach to reforming public service in Russia
(Dmitriev 2011, pp. 202-203). As a result, the policy reform was organisationally divided and full of
internal contradictions. All attempts to strengthen the influence of the Commission for
Administrative Reform or establish a new strong organisation in charge of this reform have failed.
For example, in 2004, the Ministry of Finance blocked the adoption of a federal programme which
could have provided financial resources to implement the administrative reform. At the same time,
the  proposal  to  establish  an  agency  in  charge  of  implementation  of  the  reform and  of  allocation  of
funds  was  rejected.  The  implementation  of  the  Conception  of  the  Administrative  Reform  in  2006-
2008 was delegated to the heads of the governmental agencies: in other words, Russian public
service  had  to  be  reformed by  the  officials  themselves,  who were  not  interested  in  challenging  the
status quo and did not have any incentives to implement that reform programme.
The administrative reform aimed at the de-bureaucratisation of the Russian economy and the
stimulation of business development coincided with a “statist turn” in Russian economic policy
(Gustafson 2012). Under these circumstances, state agencies abandoned some of their redundant
functions, but they also increased their encroachment into the economy by toughening governmental
regulations. Thus, a set of measures – for instance, the division of labour between the ministries
3According to the World Bank, in 2012 the percentile rank of Governance Effectiveness in Russia approached
41, and rank of Regulatory Quality approached 39 (Worldwide 2014), while the reformers set the target of 70
for both indicators by 2010 (Rasporiazhenie 2008). The Russian position in the rating of the Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception’s Index has declined – in 2012, Russia took 133th place out of 174
(Corruption 2012).
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responsible for policy development and decision-making, the federal services in charge of control
over implementation of these decisions, and the federal agencies that provide public services and
manage federal property – would lead to an increase in the number of state officials, but it could not
improve the quality of governance. When the shift to the “predatory state” model of state-business
relations occurred in Russia in the 2000s (Gel’man 2010), the administrative reform was no longer
needed.
One important obstacle to the success of the administrative reform was its long
implementation period. Putin had lost his interest in this policy area by 2005. Those experts who had
initiated the reform were replaced in the Commission for Administrative Reform by the next group
of state officials. Finally, the substance of the reform itself was reduced to permanent preparation of
new administrative regulations and to making new arrangements for state agencies’ websites. At the
same time, transparency and de-bureaucratisation of decision-making itself were no longer
considered important features of public administration and civil service.
In conclusion, the failure of the administrative reform resulted from the following factors: 1)
the lack of drivers of reform, that is leaders who would have enough will and power to impose key
decisions despite resistance from major interest groups; 2) the dispersed responsibility among
officials  and  the  lack  of  a  politically  and  administratively  strong  team  that  would  coordinate  the
actions of various governmental agencies, which led to inefficiency of reform implementation; 3)
protracted policy changes and the lack of short-term achievements, which decreased presidential
interest in this sphere of reform. As a result, the administrative reform’s goals were not achieved, and
the quality of state governance and public administration went from bad to worse.
Conclusion: Why Are Reforms (Im)possible?
The logic of Russian policy reforms analysed above is summarised in Table 2.
Table 2 is here
Although the cases outlined above obviously do not cover the entire scope of policy reforms
implemented by the Russian government within the framework of authoritarian modernisation, we
can trace the influence of the same factors on policy changes in other areas. The reform of social
benefits implemented in 2004-2005 was not a major priority for the government, but considered a
by-product of the redistribution of powers and responsibilities between the Centre and the regions. It
ultimately failed due to errors in the budgeting process (Pis’mennaya 2013) and inefficient
coordination of government agencies at the federal and regional levels (Alexandrova, Stryuk 2007,
Wengle, Rusell 2008). This reform contributed to public discontent and to protest rallies in several
cities, and led to the declining electoral performance of United Russia at the regional elections in
spring 2005 (Golosov 2011). As a result, the reform was shelved. No wonder that after this failure
the President and the government argued against implementing any new reforms, including policy
changes in other areas (Pis’mennaya 2013). Political and institutional factors affected the outcome of
this reform, alongside technical ones. Although the insulation of the government from interest groups
often allows for initiating policy changes, it can also aggravate the risk of major policy failures due
to inefficient institutional design and/or poor quality of policy implementation.
An even more vivid example of unsuccessful policy change was the police reform initiated
under Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, as convincingly analysed by Brian Taylor (Taylor 2014).
Despite the fact that the development of the rule of law and the creation of efficient law enforcement
agencies were declared by Medvedev as his main priorities, the launch of the police reform in 2009
did not bring about any significant effects. This failure was caused, on the one hand, by resistance
from influential siloviki in the presidential administration and in the government, and on the other
hand by Medvedev’s inability to build a successful pro-reform coalition. The development and
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implementation  of  the  police  reform  (including  the  reduction  of  the  number  of  law  enforcers,
personnel changes, and a structural re-organisation of agencies) were performed by Ministry of
Interior officials, who were the least interested actors when it came to genuine change. Public
discussion initiated by the president and his supporters was nominal; alternative proposals were not
discussed at all. As a result, the only visible effect of the reform was the change of the title militsiya
to politsiya (police). Numerous reshufflings among the mid-level officials were insignificant, and
soon after its start, the reform came to a halt.
In  addition,  the  failure  of  the  police  reform  demonstrates  that  policies  implemented  by  an
entrenched bureaucracy do not allow for provision of incentives for real change, but often support
the status quo. The “new” police remained an agency oriented around demonstrating appropriate
statistical reports irrespective of the real situation regarding crime (Paneyakh 2014). The reform of
healthcare demonstrates similar tendencies, with a two-fold increase in financial support in the
second half of the 2000s failing to lead to improved quality of healthcare services (Alyab’eva 2014).
Although pressure from policy entrepreneurs in some areas (such as the educational reforms) has
sometimes contributed to institutional changes, their effects are incomplete and partial due to
resistance from interest groups and to a set of organisational problems. The step-by-step process of
implementation of certain reforms’ makes policy changes even more complicated.
Are successful reforms possible within the framework of authoritarian modernisation project?
A positive answer should be heavily marked with major caveats. If a certain reform is the top
political priority of the strong and authoritative head of the state, and if a team of reformers has the
opportunity to be insulated from the major interest groups, and if it implements policy changes
quickly and they bring immediate positive results, then this reform is possible even under conditions
of poor quality of governance and inefficient institutional design. This combination of favourable
conditions is quite rare, and this is why the success story of tax and budgetary reforms in the 2000s
remains an exception. But the insulation of reformers from influence of interest groups is risky
because it does not ensure the quality of policy proposals and their implementation: the costs of
errors may increase. In addition, authoritarian modernisation projects are often implemented by
officials who are not interested in policy. Following Geddes’ metaphor, we argue that under electoral
authoritarianism “the pockets of efficiency” (Geddes 1994) are full of holes. Finally, the failure of
some policy reforms can challenge the whole project of authoritarian modernisation by undermining
the president’s incentive to continue major changes. It is unsurprising that after the failure of the
“monetisation of social benefits”, the notion of reform became taboo among the Russian leadership
(Pis’mennaya 2013). They were replaced by “national projects,” which propose only an increase in
financing without significant structural changes. When Putin returned to the presidential post in
2012, new rounds of socio-economic reforms were not discussed.
From a broad perspective, the Russian experience of authoritarian modernisation represented
in the wake of policy reforms in the 2000s demonstrates that political leaders, even those who are
interested in implementing policy changes, cannot repeat the experience of Lee Kwan Yew and other
successful dictators. Those who relied upon an inefficient bureaucracy as a basis of their own
winning coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith 2011) are rarely ready to risk a potential political
imbalance in the name of possible developmental success. Therefore their reform strategy is often
inconsistent, and the incentives to preserve the status quo are often overwhelming. In the best case,
authoritarian modernisation can result in a set of temporary and partial policy measures. In the worst
case, it turns into a demagogical smokescreen for the preservation of authoritarian power. As one can
see, this was the case of Russian experience in the early twentieth-first century: initial efforts of
policy reforms that launched soon after 2000, later on turned into words without deeds against the
background of aggravation of authoritarian trends in the country (Gel’man, 2015). Yet, there are no
guarantees that democratisation will create favourable conditions for socio-economic reforms either;
rather, it will provide new challenges. We assume, however, there is no reason to believe that policy
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Table 1 Factors of Success of Policy Reforms
Factors of policy reforms Contributed to success if: Contributed to failure if:































Table 2 Features and Outcomes of Policy Reforms in Russia in the 2000s
Feature Tax and Budgetary Reforms Educational Reforms Administrative Reform
strategic priority of reform for
political leadership
high relatively low initially high, but later low
key agents of reform ministers of finances and economic
development and their teams
officials in the ministry of
education
numerous officials in the government
and the presidential administration
concentration of agents of
reform during policy adoption
and implementation
high low low
resistance of interest groups strong (in some areas), but not
coordinated
strong (in all areas), but not
coordinated
strong (in all areas)
insulation of reformers from
influence of opponents
high (due to presidential support) limited in some arenas; self-
insulation in the case of the
Unified State Exam experiment
none – the reform has been
implemented by the major interest
groups (the officials themselves)
process of adoption and
implementation of policy
changes




implemented over many years
multi-stage, major decisions made
and implemented for many years





consequences of reform reduction of the tax burden, stimulation
of economic growth, increase of fiscal
revenues to the state budget
standardising a system of
evaluation of school graduates
(despite numerous defects)
increasing number of officials and
rise of their salaries
overall assessment of reform (incomplete) success Unified State Exam - success,
GIFO - failure
failure
23
